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1 Introduction
Almost all political decisions are inﬂuenced by special interests. Politicians pay
tribute to interest groups’ preferences, and interest groups spend remarkable
resources to shape policies in their favor. A lot of theoretical research has been
undertaken on these issues in the last years, which led to considerable new
insights. The aim of this article is to lay down the most important approaches
in this ﬁeld.
This surveys considers the activities of a given set of lobbies, which try to
inﬂuence the political decision of an incumbent politician.1 Research on these
issues began with reduced form and rather abstract models of political inﬂu-
ence, which provide some general insights and have found many applications.
However, they treat the political process mainly as a black box. Newer ap-
proaches like the common agency framework or signalling models recently ad-
vanced much. They provide a microeconomic framework of lobbying, which
nowadays represents the ”state of the art”. These models, as well as the most
important extensions, are reviewed in great detail. The questions I wish to
address in the following sections are:
What are the welfare eﬀects of lobbying?
For instance, does lobbying increase or decrease welfare? Under what circum-
stances is lobbying welfare enhancing? And what is the type of improvement
achieved through lobbying?
Who beneﬁts from lobbying?
The question arises whether interest groups always beneﬁt if they engage in
lobbying. Or may it be the case that interest groups lobby without any eﬀect?
How does lobbying competition aﬀect the distribution of beneﬁts? Does the
politician beneﬁt from lobbying?
What are relevant policy ﬁelds for lobbying?
This question is closely related to the distribution of beneﬁts. One would
expect that interest groups try to inﬂuence those policy ﬁelds where lobbying
may be successful. What are the characteristics of relevant policy ﬁelds?
A shortcoming of these approaches is that they mainly exist in parallel, which
means that lobbying is either conceptualized as contribution payments or
transmission of information. However, lobbying often consists of combined
forms of these activities. It is not yet well understood which way of inﬂuence
an interest group prefers, and what the relevant conditions for this choice are.
The literature has started to answer these questions recently, which might yield
to a consolidation of these yet two distinct branches of research into a general
lobbying model. This survey will also take account of these promising ﬁrst
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approaches.
My approach contrasts with existing surveys on lobbying in several respects.2
First, most of these surveys cover only a speciﬁc branch of the literature,
i.e. either common agency or signalling models, but not both. There is a
lack of surveys which cover all these approaches in a comprehensive way and
relate them to each other. Second, as the literature recently advanced much,
important extensions to the basic lobbying models need to be covered. To my
best knowledge, approaches like the models of mass movement, the questions
of instrument choice, models of group formation, or the choice of lobbying
instruments have not yet been surveyed. My contribution tries to ﬁll this gap
and give a comprehensive overview over all relevant approaches. Third, many
surveys focus on political economy models in the context of trade theory, as
much of the pioneering research has been conducted in this ﬁeld of research.
In contrast, the objective of this survey is to give a broad and general intuition
of how lobbying aﬀects politics. It shall not be restricted to trade policy but
cover all relevant topics of policy formation, as for instance the provision of
public goods, regulation of industries, or environmental policy. Reference to
trade is given only if it appears crucial for an understanding of the underlying
eﬀects.
2 Reduced Form Approaches
Reduced form lobbying models abstract from certain aspects of individual
behavior. As these are already surveyed extensively, I will restrict myself
to a broad overview (Helpman 1995, Rodrik 1995, Potters and van Winden
1996). The regulatory approach by Peltzman (1976) assumes that the politician
sets a policy in order to maximize a weighted sum of special interests utility
and aggregate welfare. These weights are exogenous. They can be thought
of as resulting from an underlying lobbying process which is not explicitly
analyzed. Hence, the regulatory approach focuses on the determination of
the policy outcome, given that some kind of special interest activities lead
to a policy bias in favor of a certain group. This approach has found many
applications, mostly in the context of international trade policy (compare for
instance Hillman (1982), Hillman (1989), Long van and Vousden (1991), Maggi
and Rodriguez Clare (2000), Hahn (1990)).
The policy formation approach by Becker (1983) focuses on the lobbying pro-
cess, but abstracts from individual behavior of the politician. Instead, it in-
troduces an ”inﬂuence function”, which states how realized policies depend on
lobbies’ contribution payments. The approach determines the lobbying eﬀorts
endogenously and derives comparative statics results. For instance, lobbying
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increases if the deadweight loss of redistribution becomes more important or
the politician caters more to special interests. Several applications of this
model exist, again predominantly in the context of international trade policy
(compare for instance Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Wellisz and Wilson (1986),
Pecorino (1997), Damania (1999), Polk and Schmutzler (2002)).
3 Contribution payments to an incumbent gov-
ernment
This section focusses on the incentive motive of lobbying. Contributions pro-
vide incentives for the politician to deviate from a ﬁrst best policy choice. In
contrast to the reduced form models of section 2, these models fully specify
the objective function of both the politician and the interest groups. This
allows for an analysis of strategic interaction amid interest groups, and vis a
vis the politician. Moreover, lobbies’ objective functions result from a fully
speciﬁed microeconomic general equilibrium model, and are not made ad hoc.
This allows further insights concerning the resulting equilibrium policies.
The models of this section make use of theoretical results from common agency
theory, which comprises situations in which a set of principals inﬂuences the
decision of a common agent (Bernheim and Whinston 1986a, Bernheim and
Whinston 1986b). This general setup, which is not speciﬁc to lobbying games,
will be described in section 3.1. Speciﬁc applications to lobbying are crucial
for an understanding of how special interest inﬂuence works. I will discuss
an application to international trade theory extensively in section 3.2, which
nowadays serves as a workhorse model (Grossman and Helpman 1994). I
focus on the underlying intuition which is valid for a broad class of lobbying
applications and not restricted to trade theory (compare for instance Aidt
(1998) in the context of environmental policy, and Neven and Ro¨ller (2000) in
the context of regulation theory). Recent approaches to lobbying, which are
mainly extensions of the basic model, will subsequently be discussed in section
3.3.
3.1 Common agency theory
The common agency framework is characterized by an agent and a set of
principals (Bernheim and Whinston 1986a). The agent chooses an action p
among a feasible set of actions, which aﬀects his own utility, W (p), and that of
the principals i = 1...n. As the individual utility levels Ui(p) of all principals
depend on the action of the agent, principals face an incentive to inﬂuence
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his choice. In the ﬁrst stage of the game, each principal makes a contingent
contribution oﬀer. These oﬀers are individual payment functions Ci(p), which
state money rewards to the agent for each possible action he might choose.
Individual payment functions thus map actions into money payments. The
agent observes the contribution oﬀers and decides which action to choose in
the second stage of the game. Then principals make their payments which, in
conjunction with the chosen action, determine the individual utility levels of
all players.
Lobbying applications ﬁt well into this framework: The politician (the agent)
decides about a policy p which aﬀects the payoﬀs to the principals (the interest
groups), who in turn try to inﬂuence his choice. In the ﬁrst stage of the game,
each lobby decides on a non-negative contribution function Ci(p), which is a
menu oﬀer to the politician, stating how much money will be paid for each
alternative policy realization. In the second stage, the politician observes
these oﬀers, determines the policy, and collects the respective money oﬀers.
The politician may well have preferences about the policy. For instance, a
benevolent politician will prefer the policy which maximizes aggregate welfare.
Any deviation then reduces aggregate welfare, and thereby his utility level.
Contribution oﬀers by special interest groups serve to compensate the agent
for any deviation from the welfare maximizing policy, which gives them the
ﬂavor of political bribes. On the other hand, if the politician is completely
opportunistic, he cares only about contributions, but not about the policy
itself.
A political equilibrium consists of a policy choice p∗ and a set of individual
contribution schedules {C∗i (p)}i. The equilibrium [{C∗i (p)}i , p∗] determines
the utility levels of the lobbies, Ui(p
∗) − C∗i (p∗), and the utility of the agent,
W (p∗) + C∗(p∗), with C∗(p∗) ≡∑iC∗i (p∗), such that
• The politician maximizes his payoﬀ through the choice of p∗, given the
set of equilibrium contribution functions C∗i (p), i.e.
p∗ ≡ argmaxW (p) + C∗(p).
• Each lobby maximizes its utility level through the choice of a contribu-
tion function C∗i (p), given the set of contribution functions of the other
lobbies, C∗−i(p), and the resulting policy vector p
∗.
The setup assumes that individual utility levels are separable in money income
and the policy eﬀect, and that any contribution oﬀer is reliable in the sense that
contribution payments are indeed made after the policy choice. Moreover, it is
crucial that lobbies are fully informed about the payoﬀ functions of all players:
The equilibrium demands that each lobby is able to calculate how policies aﬀect
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the other lobbies and the politician. In contrast, the politician only needs to
observe the contribution oﬀers of the lobbies. Hence the equilibrium exists
if the politician is imperfectly informed about lobbies preferences. Finally,
note that the common agency framework is characterized by non-cooperative
behavior of all players. The approach is very general. It does not rely on
speciﬁc assumptions concerning lobbying competition. For instance, if the
interest groups follow a common interest, the resulting payoﬀ-structure reﬂects
free-riding incentives of lobbies. In this case, each group tries to contribute
as few as possible for a certain policy deviation. In contrast, if lobbies follow
opposing interests, the equilibrium focuses on the eﬀect of severe lobbying
competition.
Properties of the equilibrium: Bernheim and Whinston characterize any possi-
ble subgame perfect Nash-Equilibrium [p∗, {C∗i (p)}i] for the class of common
agency games: Apart from some feasibility constraints, the equilibrium policy
choice p∗ maximizes the utility level of the politician, given the set of optimal
contribution functions C∗i (p). (This shouldn’t surprise you much). Second,
there is no lobby with a policy alternative po which increases its payoﬀ to such
an extent that it is able to compensate the politician for a deviation towards po.
If this were the case, the lobby would be able to modify its contribution sched-
ule and induce the politician to choose po instead. As a result, both would be
better oﬀ and [p∗, {C∗i (p)}i] cannot be an equilibrium. The condition can also
be interpreted in an alternative way: The optimal policy maximizes the joint
payoﬀs to the politician and any one lobby, given the contribution payments
of all other lobbies. If this were not the case, then the lobby and the politician
could jointly increase their payoﬀs by a policy deviation and an appropriate
compensation.3 The third property is a condition on the contribution func-
tion of each lobby, which states that each lobby oﬀers zero contributions for
at least one policy choice. Suppose this condition did not hold for any lobby.
Then this lobby could slightly reduce all its contribution oﬀers by the same
amount, without aﬀecting the behavior of the politician: The politician com-
pares all possible policy outcomes and the associated contribution payments.
This optimization problem is not aﬀected if a lobby reduces all contribution
oﬀers uniformly. Thus a lobby is able to increase its payoﬀ without aﬀecting
the policy choice, if not at least one contribution oﬀer is zero. This cannot be
an equilibrium.
Truthful strategies and existence: Many equilibrium sets of policy choices and
contribution functions may exist. The question thus arises if some of these are
focal. This leads to the introduction of a reﬁnement to the Nash-equilibrium,
i.e. the notion of ”truthfulness”: A principal’s strategy is truthful relative
to some reference policy p′ if his contribution function reﬂects his true will-
ingness to pay for a deviation from p′ to any policy alternative p. Thus, a
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truthful contribution schedule consists of oﬀers which make a lobby indiﬀerent
between the reference policy and any policy alternative p for which it oﬀers
positive contributions.4 A truthful Nash equilibrium is characterized by truth-
ful strategies of all principals, and the reference policy is the equilibrium policy
p∗.
The authors further show that the set of best response correspondences of
any principal contains a truthful strategy. This implies that all individuals
can do best and reveal their true willingness to pay for any possible policy
alternative, given the opponents’ anticipated contribution oﬀers C−i(p), and
the implied policy choice by the politician. Hence truthful Nash equilibria may
be interpreted as being focal. However, they are not necessarily unique.
Moreover, any truthful Nash equilibrium implies an eﬃcient policy choice, and
each eﬃcient policy choice can be supported by a truthful Nash equilibrium.
That is, the policy outcome of the lobbying game is the same as the policy
choice of a benevolent politician! To understand this, note that eﬃciency
refers to the policy choice and the resulting payoﬀs of all principals and the
agent, but not necessarily to eﬃciency measures related to aggregate welfare.
For instance, if free trade is the ﬁrst best policy and all relevant groups are
organized, lobbying competition leads to a free trade; If only some organize,
lobbying competition induces ineﬃciencies and leads to a deviation from free
trade, although the political equilibrium is eﬃcient from the politician’s and
the organized lobbies’ point of view. The intuition for this result is as follows:
All lobbies consider only their private beneﬁts and costs through a policy
deviation, but ignore its social eﬀects. The politician internalizes these eﬀects,
as all lobbies reveal their true assessment of each policy alternative. If all
groups organize, this leads to an eﬃcient policy choice. This result is also
important in order to determine whether an equilibrium is unique: If the
common agency model is applied to a policy setup which has a unique ﬁrst
best policy, this policy is also realized in the lobbying game as a unique truthful
Nash equilibrium.
3.2 The basic lobbying model
The ﬁrst application of the common agency framework to a lobbying game
is Grossman and Helpman (1994).5 The authors determine the structure of
protection in a small open economy, where import competing and exporting
sectors organize as lobbies. I will start with a sketch of the model and discuss
extensions thereafter. These also refer to the context of international trade.
The rest of this section will therefore be biased towards trade theory, as other
policy applications are still rare.
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Assume a small open economy which takes world market prices as given. The
economy consists of an exogenous set of sectors. Each sector produces a ho-
mogenous product with labor and a sector speciﬁc input. A good is considered
importable if imports and domestic production satisfy domestic demand for
that good, and domestic producers compete with foreign ﬁrms. A good is
called exportable if the domestic sector exports the good and competes with
foreign ﬁrms in the foreign market. Individuals have identical indirect utility
functions which are separable in income and consumer surplus from consump-
tion. Each individual owns speciﬁc factors of one sector. Factor speciﬁc income
increases in the domestic price level of that particular good. Income consists
of factor income, wage income, and tariﬀ revenue.
Individuals diﬀer only with respect to their sector speciﬁc income. They are
grouped along sectoral lines, where each group or sector consists of a fraction
αi of individuals, with
∑
i αi = 1. The model abstracts from incentives to
organize as lobbies, and assumes an exogenously given set of lobbies, such
that αL is the fraction of all organized individuals (compare section 3.3). Each
lobby faces a trade-oﬀ concerning the structure of protection, which determines
domestic prices: The factor income of a group depends positively on the output
price of that speciﬁc sector; moreover tariﬀ revenue increases in the prices of
all sectors, and decreases in the size of the export subsidies. These two aspects
work towards higher protection. But the members of a lobby act as consumers
as well, and consumer surplus decreases in output prices. This eﬀect tends
towards lower protection.
The politician determines domestic prices through the choice of the tariﬀ struc-
ture. The timing of the game is familiar from the common agency setup: In the
ﬁrst stage of the game, each lobby determines its contribution schedule non-
cooperatively, which maps every possible domestic price structure into a con-
tribution oﬀer. In the second stage of the game, the politician observes these
oﬀers and decides on the structure of protection. He maximizes a weighted
sum of aggregate welfare and contribution payments. The relative weight put
on aggregate welfare is denoted by α.
Besides the general results of the former section, which characterize the equi-
librium, the following main insights are worth mentioning: First, the model
gives a microeconomic foundation for the reduced form regulatory approach,
which departs from the assumption that the government determines the tariﬀ
structure in order to maximize a weighted sum of aggregate welfare and con-
tribution payments. The common agency theory tells us to focus on truthful
contribution schedules, which reﬂect the eﬀect of a marginal policy change
on the payoﬀ to that particular group. Hence if the politician maximizes a
weighted sum of aggregate welfare and truthful contribution schedules in the
common agency approach, he in fact maximizes a weighted sum of aggregate
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welfare and special interest utility. This is exactly what the reduced form
regulatory approach assumes.
Second, the political equilibrium determines the tariﬀ in an import competing
sector i as
t∗i
1 + t∗i
=
Ii − αL
α+ aL
z∗i
ε∗i
,
where ti is the tariﬀ or subsidy in that sector, Ii is a dummy variable which
equals one if the sector is organized (and zero otherwise), z∗i is the equilib-
rium ratio of domestic outputs to imports, and ε∗i is the (positively deﬁned)
import demand elasticity in the sector. The equilibrium tariﬀ is positive if the
group is organized as a lobby, and negative otherwise, i.e. organized import
competing sectors receive positive protection through import tariﬀs; unorga-
nized import competing sectors receive negative protection through import
subsidies.6 Intuitively, lobbies care for income and consumption. The income
interest dominates with respect to the own sector: A high output price in-
creases factor incomes, which outweighs the loss in consumer surplus of that
good. The consumption eﬀect dominates in all other sectors, as a lobby re-
ceives no factor income there and the gain from tariﬀ revenue is too small. As
a result, each lobby prefers consumption subsidies in all other sectors except
its own, where it prefers a tariﬀ. This is where conﬂict of interest between
lobbies comes into play: From a lobby’s perspective, some of the other sectors
are also organized and lobby for high prices of their good and low prices in
all other sectors. Thus lobbying eﬀorts partly oﬀsets each other. In sum, all
organized sectors obtain positive protection. Sectors which are not organized
do not inﬂuence the politician. They receive negative protection.
The resulting equilibrium tariﬀ of an organized sector increases in the share of
domestic production, because large sectors gain much from a marginal increase
in protection and have an incentive to lobby intensively. But high protection
also entails a two-fold cost: First, the social cost of protection is high in sectors
with large import demand elasticities. The equilibrium tariﬀ structure entails
some Ramsey-like elements. Sectors facing inelastic import demand receive
more protection, because the welfare loss through protection is relatively small.
Moreover, this aspect becomes unimportant if the politician does not care much
about aggregate welfare, and protection increases. Second, high protection also
implies a cost for the organized interest groups in their role as consumers. If
the fraction of organized individuals is large, consumer interests become more
important and protection declines in organized sectors. In unorganized sectors,
negative protection increases as the consumption interests of organized lobbies
become more important. Note that even if the politician has no concern for
aggregate welfare at all, the level of protection is limited due to the fact that
lobbies partially internalize the cost of protection.
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How does conﬂict of interest aﬀect the equilibrium policy? Suppose only one
sector is organized as a lobby. The equilibrium policy is a tariﬀ in the organized
sector, and negative protection in all others. The lobby increases its income
through high protection in its own, and consumption rents through negative
protection in all other sectors. This is politically feasible, because there are no
opposing forces if only one lobby exists. It also implies that if the size of the
organized lobby is negligibly small (αL = 0), lobbies’ consumption interests
become unimportant, and the political equilibrium entails positive protection
in the organized sector and free trade in all others. Moreover, the lobby receives
the full surplus of its inﬂuence: Each lobby pays contributions which exactly
compensate the politician for the policy he would have chosen if that lobby
was not active. If only one lobby exists, this reference policy is the free trade
equilibrium. The lobby compensates the politician for the protectionist policy
deviation, and the politician receives a payoﬀ which is equivalent to his free
trade payoﬀ. The lobby gets all the extra rent through the political interaction.
Note that the general common agency framework predicts that lobbying com-
petition yields an eﬃcient policy choice. Eﬃciency refers to the set of principals
and the agent, notably the politician and all existing lobbies. If only a fraction
of sectors organize as lobbies, the politically eﬃcient outcome is not equivalent
to the eﬃcient welfare maximizing policy, which is free trade. The reason is
that the politician and the lobby can increase their joint payoﬀ by a deviation
from free trade. This deviation imposes costs on all other individuals, which
is only fully internalized if all individuals organize as lobbies. If this is not the
case, ineﬃcient outcomes occur.
Suppose next that all sectors organize as interest groups. Each group tries
to increase protection in its own sector and reduce protection in all others.
Special interests are fully opposed in this case. Free trade emerges in the
political equilibrium. Intuitively, each lobby ignores social costs and tries to
induce high protection in its own, and low protection in all other sectors.
Truthful contribution oﬀers reﬂect these incentives. The politician is thus able
to internalize all eﬀects through policy deviations. He implements the free
trade outcome if all groups participate in the political contest. Moreover, he
captures a rent through the political context. The politician will implement
the same policy as without lobbying, and receives contribution payments in
equilibrium. The reason is that each lobby must engage in lobbying to prevent
an individually disadvantageous outcome. If a lobby does not participate,
lobbying by its competitors implies negative protection in its own and positive
protection in all other sectors. Lobbying engagement is thus necessary to
prevent this unfavorable outcome, and the best possible policy from a lobby’s
point of view is free trade. Hence lobbies are trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma.
I now discuss if there is scope for lobbying cooperation in this case.
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3.3 Extensions
3.3.1 Policy choice
The basic lobbying model makes some particular assumptions which will be
suspended in the following. Consider ﬁrst the question of policy instrument
choice. The basic lobbying model abstracts from this question, because there
is only one instrument available. But it leaves room for conjectures. Suppose
an eﬃcient and an ineﬃcient policy instrument are available. The conjecture
is that the amount of lobbying competition determines the instrument choice:
Suppose that a single group is organized and no lobbying competition prevails.
In equilibrium, the lobby receives all of the surplus resulting from the politi-
cal game. It compensates the politician for the cost of providing the service,
which is lower if the eﬃcient instrument is employed. Hence a lobby facing
low competition prefers a more eﬃcient instrument, because this decreases
contribution payments to the politician. Next, suppose that all groups are
organized and compete with each other. The contribution payment of each
lobby is a compensation for not deviating from free trade. The deviation (and
hence compensation) is smaller if the policy instrument is ineﬃcient, because
the costs of providing services is higher for the politician. Hence compen-
sations are smaller with ineﬃcient instruments. Consequently, lobbies prefer
ineﬃcient policy instruments when competition is severe. In other words: If
competition among lobbies is weak, the ability to lobby is a beneﬁt, and more
eﬃcient instruments decrease compensation payments. In contrast, if compe-
tition among lobbies is severe, the ability to lobby is a necessary duty in order
not to remain unheard in the political process. In this case, lobbies prefer
ineﬃcient means, because this reduces obligatory compensation payments.
Several authors extend the basic lobbying game to the choice between various
policy instruments, but do not explicitly discuss the relationship between the
degree of competition and policy eﬃciency. For instance, Rama and Tabellini
(1998) analyze two interest groups which compete with respect to one policy
variable and coincide with respect to the other. The economy consists of
two sectors. The unorganized sector produces only with labor. The import
competing organized sector produces with labor and capital. Factor owners
of the latter sector organize along factor lines, i.e. a lobby of workers and a
lobby of capitalists exist. The available policies are a price increasing tariﬀ,
which beneﬁts the workers and the capitalist alike, and a minimum wage in
the import competing sector, which increases the payoﬀ to the workers at
the expense of capital owners. The authors show that a tariﬀ redistributes
income towards capitalists, and leads to allocative ineﬃciencies: The organized
sector expands if protection is high, which attracts labor from the unorganized
sector. The minimum wage works against the allocative ineﬃciency. Labor
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becomes more expensive, which tends to oﬀset the initial incentive to expand
production. The minimum wage corrects for the allocative ineﬃciency, given
that a tariﬀ exists. Hence labor politics redistribute income between capitalists
and organized workers, and imply a second best outcome. Moreover, these
policy instruments are strategic complements: The politician has an incentive
to increase the minimum wage if the tariﬀ is high, because it corrects for
allocative ineﬃciencies.
Other contributions are Dixit (1996), who incorporates production and con-
sumption subsidies/taxes and heterogenous group sizes into the basic model.
This leads to consumption subsidies (taxes) of goods which are consumed above
(below) average by organized lobbies. Maggi and Rodriguez Clare (2000) ana-
lyze the choice between voluntary export restraints, import taxes and import
quotas in a trade model, and derive conditions for the use of each instrument.
Resulting policies depend on the relative political weights of foreign lobbies to
domestic importers, and on the shadow costs of taxation.
3.3.2 Strategic interaction between governments
The basic lobbying model assumes a small country. This implies that the
agent sets the policy independently of possible countervailing measures by a
foreign country, i.e. strategic interaction between diﬀerent agents plays no
role. Grossman and Helpman (1995) extent the basic lobbying model regard-
ing this aspect and consider strategic interaction between two governments.
This extension is relevant to the common agency model more generally: The
governments now constitute two agents, which face inﬂuence from distinct
sets of principals (the lobbies) in their home countries. Countries trade with
each other, which establishes the link between domestic tariﬀ structures. As
a consequence, governments can no longer independently respond to lobbying
activities, but need to take strategic interactions with the other government
into account.
There are two countries, which have the same characteristics as in section 3.2.
Countries trade exclusively with each other, which means that import demand
and export supply as well as the endogenous tariﬀ structures determine world
market prices. The tariﬀ structure in each country is a result of the political
interaction between domestic lobbies and the government, and of the strategic
interaction between both governments. The timing of the game corresponds to
that of the basic lobbying game. The model assumes that lobbies inﬂuence only
their domestic governments, but not the government of the foreign country.
Consider the case in which governments set trade policies non-cooperatively.
Each lobby’s payoﬀ now depends on the trade policies of both countries, and
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not only on the domestic country. Accordingly, a contribution schedule maps
each domestic tariﬀ structure into money oﬀers for any given trade structure
of the foreign country. An equilibrium of this modiﬁed game is deﬁned by a set
of truthful contribution schedules of lobbies in each country and the resulting
structures of protection in each country, such that the contribution oﬀers and
the resulting trade policies are mutual best responses.7
The resulting structure of protection reﬂects two elements. The ﬁrst is the
political aspect, which is the same as in the basic lobbying model: Due to
political pressures, organized sectors tend to gain protection at the expense of
unorganized sectors. Protection in a sector is high if the politician cares much
for money, the group is small, and the sector is large. The second aspect is that
protection also depends on strategic considerations by the governments. The
outcome is an additional tariﬀ component, which modiﬁes the tariﬀ structure
through a terms of trade component. This terms of trade eﬀect, which increases
domestic tariﬀ revenue, is familiar from the early strategic trade literature
(Johnson 1954): It implies an export tariﬀ for exporting sectors, and an import
tariﬀ for importing industries, which decreases in the import demand or export
supply elasticities of the foreign country. Intuitively, high foreign elasticities
imply strong foreign quantity reactions to domestic trade measures, which
increases the deadweight loss of protection.8
The political element and the terms of trade eﬀect may reinforce or dampen
each other. Consider for instance an organized importing industry. Political
pressures work towards an import tariﬀ. So does the terms of trade eﬀect,
and both reinforce each other. Next consider an organized exporting industry.
The political element works towards an export subsidy, but the terms of trade
motive favors an export tax. In this case, the eﬀects work against each other.
The resulting trade structure depends on the relative strength of both eﬀects.
How do political parameters aﬀect protection? Consider for instance the case
in which the domestic government becomes less benevolent, and contributions
become more important. This implies that lobbying costs decrease and pro-
tection increases (compare section 3.2). But a change in the domestic trade
structure now also aﬀects the foreign country, because lobbies oﬀer contri-
butions in anticipation of the resulting tariﬀ structures. Organized foreign
exporters face an incentive to oﬀset increased domestic protection through an
increase in export subsidies, or a decrease in export taxes. Hence, the strate-
gic interaction of both governments works against the initial eﬀect of increased
protection, and trade enhancement by the exporting country tends to oﬀset
the initial increase of trade protection by the importing country. As a result,
increased domestic government sensitivity to special interests then beneﬁts or-
ganized lobbies of that country. Moreover, the terms of trade and domestic
welfare of this country increase. This is a surprising result: A government
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which gets more aligned to special interests tends to increase domestic welfare
through the implied strategic reaction of the foreign country. However, this
result depends crucially on the assumption that the foreign government does
not change its own responsiveness to special interests in response.
3.3.3 Incentives of lobbies to cooperate
The common agency framework and the basic lobbying model indicate that
lobbies face incentives to cooperate. Lobbying leads to excessive contributions
if interest groups compete with each other. For instance if all sectors organize
as interest groups in the basic lobbying model, each lobby pays contributions
but the equilibrium policy remains free trade. This is the same outcome as
if no contributions where paid at all, and scope for cooperation exists. In
contrast, suppose that lobbies do not compete at all, which is the case if the
consumption share of each lobby is negligibly small. Then, the joint payoﬀ to
all lobbies is the sum of the individual payoﬀs in the non-cooperative game
setting. Hence no scope for cooperation among lobbies exists.
Rama and Tabellini (1998) analyze the incentives of labor and capitalist lob-
bies to cooperate (compare also Levy (1999) and Aidt (1997) for cooperation
in the context of trade theory). Tariﬀs and minimum wages make up the avail-
able policy instruments (compare the preceding paragraphs about the topic of
instrument choice). The authors derive conditions such that cooperative lob-
bying leads to higher payoﬀs than non-cooperative lobbying. Particularly, this
tends to be the case if the sum of the joint payoﬀs between the government and
any of the lobbies is high compared to the payoﬀ to a coalition consisting of
all lobbies and the government. Intuitively, if the government achieves a high
joint payoﬀ with any of the two lobbies alone, it is able to outplay the lobbies
against each other and beneﬁt from ﬁrm conﬂict of interest between lobbies. In
contrast, if the joint payoﬀ to a coalition of all players, that is the government
and both lobbies, is high, there is an interest to include all relevant groups in
the political process, even if lobbies behave non-cooperatively. This is the case
of low lobbying competition, where gains from cooperation are small (compare
Laussel and Le Breton (2001) for a generalization of this aspect in the context
of common agency theory).
3.3.4 Group formation
Lobby groups are not single entities, but rather consist of individuals who
contribute to the group’s activities. This is of importance, because the beneﬁt
of lobbying has the characteristic of a public good if the induced policy change
through lobbying aﬀects all individuals in society and it is not possible to
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exclude anybody from it. Hence incentives to free-ride within lobbies may
result, and the question arises under which conditions interest groups emerge.
Although this question has been raised and discussed in the early beginning of
public choice theory, this ﬁeld of research has long been left aside, but recently
faces greater interest again.
Olson (1965) asks which groups are more likely to overcome the free-rider prob-
lem and thus may be able to form a lobby. He focuses on two factors, namely
group size and social pressure. His idea is that the beneﬁts of lobbying dilute
with an increasing number of group members. Hence, individual incentives to
provide the public good are higher in small groups than in large groups. It is
more likely that small groups are able to overcome the free-riding problem if
group formation is to be expected at all. Moreover, social pressure may be a
means of inhibiting free-riding. As it is more easily exerted in small groups,
this aspect also tends to increase the likelihood that if interest groups emerge,
then they are small.
Mitra (1999) abstracts from incentives to free-ride within interest groups. He
extends the basic lobbying model and analyzes the entry decision of interest
groups. These decisions determine the equilibrium number of interest groups
and the degree of lobbying competition. Groups are heterogenous with respect
to ﬁxed costs of organization, and each group knows the entry costs of its
opponents. Thus, lobbies are able to anticipate who enters in equilibrium,
which allows them to derive the net beneﬁt of its own entry decision and
compare it to its costs.
The beneﬁt of political participation consists of the utility gain from the in-
duced policy change if the interest groups is active, net of necessary contribu-
tion payments to induce this change. The author shows that beneﬁts decrease
with lobbying competition. First, increased competition aﬀects the structure of
protection. Positive protection for organized groups decreases, because oppos-
ing interests tend to cancel each other out; negative protection of unorganized
sectors increases, because the beneﬁt on behalf of the organized increases with
many active lobbies. It can be shown that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the sec-
ond, and active lobby groups gain from low lobbying competition. Second, the
beneﬁt of entry depends negatively on the necessary contribution payments.
With many active groups, contribution payments tend to be high due to pure
number counting. But necessary compensation payments per lobby decrease if
lobbying competition is strong, as well as the compensation for the decline in
aggregate welfare. The total eﬀect on contributions is thus ambiguous. How-
ever, it can be shown that in sum the negative eﬀects dominate the positive
ones and the beneﬁt of entry declines in the number of interest groups.
In equilibrium, the number of lobbies as well as who enters is uniformly de-
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termined, because each group is able to calculate how many groups enter and
who stays out. Those lobbies who do not organize anticipate that the cost of
organization exceeds its net beneﬁts, whereas those who enter anticipate that
the degree of lobbying competition is small enough such that the beneﬁt of
entry exceeds its costs.
The author extends the model and derives comparative static results. For in-
stance, if more individuals gain from factor speciﬁc income, the degree of lob-
bying competition declines. Intuitively, if more individuals beneﬁt from high
factor income through positive protection, less individuals can be exploited
through negative protection. The net beneﬁt of being active declines and less
interest groups organize. Moreover, if the concern for contribution payments
increases, the number of lobbies increases. The politician caters more to ac-
tive lobbies in this case, which increases incentives to organize.9 Finally, if
the assumption of homogenous groups is relaxed, it can be shown that sectors
beneﬁt more form organization if they are small, face inelastic demand, and
have large capital stocks.
Damania and Fredriksson (2000) focus on incentives to free-ride in a setup
where two interest groups follow a common interest. Each group may either
abstain from lobbying, lobby alone, or form a coalition with the other lobby.
The authors state conditions such that free-riding on the other ﬁrm’s lobbying
activities, joint lobbying, or unilateral lobbying occurs in the state game. If
the game is repeated inﬁnitely, cooperation may result even if free-riding is
the optimal behavior in the state game. Cooperation is implemented through
trigger strategies, which lets each ﬁrm cooperate as long as the other one does.
Cooperation is more likely if the short hand beneﬁt of defection is small relative
to the discounted future beneﬁts of cooperation.
4 Signalling models
This section gives an alternative explanation of why politicians may respond to
interest groups. The argument does not rely on the assumption that politicians
are self-interested. Rather, benevolent politicians have an incentive to listen to
interest groups when they are imperfectly informed and lobbies possess better
information about the relevant policy. For instance, the politician might be
unsure about the preferences of the electorate, or about the state of the world in
which the policy takes eﬀect. Lobbies may be better informed, either because
they are ”closer” to the preferences of their members, or they have speciﬁc
expertise in certain policy ﬁelds. This is the information motive for lobbying.
Lobbying gives politicians a chance to improve their decisions in this context.
However, interest groups are self interested and politicians cannot simply trust
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their speeches. They have to extract the informative part of the received mes-
sages, based on their available a priori information. Lobby groups, on the
other hand, know the way politicians discount their messages. They adjust
their strategies accordingly to appear trustworthy. Formally, the relationship
between interest groups and the politician is modelled as a signalling game
in which these groups try to persuade a benevolent policy maker on a certain
policy, who in turn improves the informational basis of his decision. They all
rely on the equilibrium concept of Sequential or Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
and, depending on the speciﬁc model characteristics, speciﬁc reﬁnements.10
The models can be categorized according to the following table.
policy discrete continuous
number of lobbies one many
access to the politician costless costly
lobby’s information perfect imperfect
message can be veriﬁed can not be veriﬁed
signal informative uninformative
signalling costs sunk productive
Table 1: Categorization of signalling models.
Section 4.1 explains the basic signalling model with one interest group which
submits information strategically. Section 4.2 extends this model to several
lobbies and allows for lobbying competition. The relevant approaches can also
be reinterpreted as models of ”mass movement”, if we interpret each lobby
as an individual which has to decide if to take a certain action or not. For
instance, this action may be the decision to participate in public demonstra-
tions, or it may consist of individual activities like sending postcards, writing
letters etc. Section 4.3 ﬁnally discusses various extensions to these models.
4.1 The basic signalling model
The models of Potters and van Winden (1992), and Ainsworth (1993) and Sloof
(1997b) are basic signalling models whose intuition is broadly valid. There are
two states of the world, denoted by θ1 and θ2, whose realization is not known
to the politician, but known to the lobby. The politician has prior beliefs about
the probability that a certain state occurs. Further, he implements one of the
policy alternatives τ 1 or τ 2. Each alternative ”ﬁts” one state. The payoﬀ to
the politician is high if he implements the correct policy in each state and low
if he implements the wrong one. Hence, the task of the politician is to choose
- 16-
Lobbying - A Survey Andreas Polk
a correct policy under uncertainty.
A single lobby guides the politician in his choice. This lobby observes the
realized state of the world and has perfect information. It can inform the
politician about the realized state by sending a costly signal. The cost of the
signal is denoted by c. The politician, who observes only the signal but not
the true state of the world, anticipates that sending a signal is only worth for
certain types of interest groups. He updates his beliefs accordingly. The payoﬀ
to the lobby depends on the realized state of the world and may conﬂict with
the interests of the politician.
The payoﬀ matrix of the game and the ex ante probabilities are common
knowledge. The ﬁrst entry denotes the payoﬀ to the politician. The second
denotes the payoﬀ to the lobby:
θ1 θ2
τ 1 a, 0 0, 0
τ 2 0, d a, e
The payoﬀ to the politician is always positive, that is a > 0 . The payoﬀs to
the lobby are arbitrary and will be discussed in the following.
Suppose ﬁrst that d < 0 < e. In this case, there is no conﬂict of interest
between the politician and the lobby. They share the same interest, which is
to ﬁnd the policy suitable for each state of the world. There may or may not
be an incentive for the lobby to send a message. This depends on the lobbying
costs and on the politician’s ex ante beliefs. What is of importance for this
parameter range is that the politician can always trust the signal if he receives
one. Thus in this situation, the policy maker is perfectly informed at the time
he must implement the policy, since he knows that the lobby has no incentive
to mislead him. Without a signal, he knows that the lobby has no incentive
to send one, which indicates that the choice based on his a priori belief is the
correct one.
Suppose next that d > 0 > e. This is the case of full conﬂict of interest,
because the politician knows that he is better oﬀ mistrusting any signal he
receives. Since he knows that, he will always ignore any signal. The lobby,
anticipating the ignorance of the politician, knows that whatever it does, it
has no eﬀect. Hence it will never send a signal, because this is costly. In this
setup, there is no scope for information transmission, since the interest of the
two players are fully opposed.
The relevant parameter range in which signalling is a matter of interest is d, e >
0. This is the case of partial conﬂict between the lobby and the politician. All
models correspond to this setup unless stated otherwise. It depends on the
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state of the world whether the two players have the same interest. Note that
the lobby always prefers policy τ 2, independent of the realized state of the
world. If the state is θ2, the politician and the lobby follow a common interest.
In the following, I shall denote the lobby in this particular state of the world as
the ”good type” and the corresponding state as the ”good state”. In contrast,
if θ1 is relevant, the politician prefers τ 1 and the lobby prefers τ 2, and scope
for conﬂict arises. The lobby and the state will be denoted as ”bad type” and
”bad state” respectively. In contrast to the full conﬂict of interest case, the
politician will not systematically ignore any message, because he knows well
that in some cases truth-telling is the preferred strategy of the lobby. Hence
he can learn something from the signal he receives.
First, in order to make information revelation through signalling possible, we
need to assume that the payoﬀ to the bad type is smaller then the payoﬀ to
the good type, d < e. This condition is commonly known as the ”sorting
condition”. It assures that the bad type can not always mimic the good type.
Suppose the sorting condition does not hold: Then the payoﬀ to the bad type
is always weakly higher than the payoﬀ to the good type. To achieve this, the
bad type must only mimic the behavior of the good type (which he can always
do if d > e). The politician anticipates this and should thus mistrust any
signal. Information revelation is not possible in this case. But if the sorting
condition is satisﬁed, mimicry is not possible in any state of the world. The
good type has an incentive to send a signal in some states of the world, which
the bad type does not have.
Second, note that the content of the signal is meaningless in this setup. The
only informational content of the signal is the cost it induces. The intuition
is as follows: If the message can be chosen arbitrarily, for instance ”the state
is θ1” or ”the state is θ2”, the politician is able to derive the optimal contents
of the message if one is sent. This is due to the fact that the politician knows
the decision problem of the lobby, and is able to infer its best message. Since
he can do so, not the choice of contents is important, but only the decision to
send a signal or not. Hence all that matters are the signalling costs, but not
the contents of the signal itself.
Equilibria
High signalling costs : The resulting equilibria depend on the signalling costs
c, and on the politician’s ex ante belief. If signalling costs are high (c > e),
a unique pooling equilibrium exists in which lobbies never send a signal, and
the policy maker makes a choice based on his ex ante beliefs.11
Intermediate signalling costs: In contrast, if lobbying costs are intermediate
(d < c < e), then two types of equilibria exist, depending on the ex ante
belief of the politician. Note ﬁrst that the bad type will never send a message,
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since this induces a negative payoﬀ even if it persuades the politician. So the
focus is on the good type and its incentive to send a signal, which in turn
depends on the ex ante belief of the politician concerning τ 2. If the politician
chooses the bad policy based on his a priori belief, the unique equilibrium is
separating, and the good type always lobbies. Since the politician anticipates
this, he trusts the signal and chooses policy τ 2 after receiving a message, and
the alternative policy otherwise. The good type has no incentive to deviate,
because not sending a signal induces the unfavorable policy and zero payoﬀ.
However, if the ex ante belief of the politician induces the good policy without
signalling, two equilibria exist. The ﬁrst and most obvious equilibrium is a
pooling one, in which no signal is sent. If the politician anticipates this, he
chooses the policy based on his prior beliefs which is the appropriate one.
Moreover, there is also a separating equilibrium: If the politician assumes that
the good type always indicates that θ2 is relevant, he only selects the good
policy if this is aﬃrmed. In this case, signalling is optimal only for the good
type. Note that both equilibria induce diﬀerent expected payoﬀs and welfare
implications, which will be discussed below.
Low signalling costs : If signalling costs are low (c < d), the bad lobby may
try to mislead the politician. But it must consider the fact that the politician
knows its incentive to do so. Hence the lobby needs to provide an incentive
for the politician to listen to the signal. This incentive is not given if the bad
type always signals, because the politician would anticipate this strategy and
did not react. Thus signalling by the bad type is only a good strategy if it
leaves a chance to extract some information from the signal. This is the case
if the probability of a signal being sent by the good type is higher than the
respective probability for the bad type.
If the politician’s ex ante belief of the politician favors the bad policy, the good
type has an incentive to always send a signal. Otherwise the bad type could
mimic the good one. A unique semi-pooling equilibrium exists in which the
good type always sends a signal, and the bad type plays a mixed strategy and
mimics the good type every now and then. In this case, the politician is able to
extract some (but not all) information from the signal. After having observed
a signal, it is not optimal to choose the good policy in any case, because this
also gives the bad type an incentive to send a signal in any case. Hence in
equilibrium, the policy maker will sometimes choose the good policy if a signal
is received, and otherwise not. Accordingly, the bad type will send a message
now and then.
Next, consider the case where the politician chooses the good policy if he has
to decide based on his a priori belief. In this case, no separating equilibrium
exists, since a separating equilibrium requires that the good type always sends
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a message, whereas the bad type never does. But as argued above, this is no
good strategy for the bad type if signalling costs are suﬃciently low. Thus, only
pooling and semi-pooling equilibria exist. There are two pooling equilibria. In
the ﬁrst, both types never lobby and the politician always chooses the good
policy. No lobby has an incentive to send a costly signal, and the politician
chooses the best policy based on his a priori beliefs. In the second pooling
equilibrium, both types always lobby and the politician chooses the good policy
only if he receives a signal. Note that not sending a signal cannot be optimal,
because this would induce policy τ 1, which yields a strictly lower payoﬀ for the
lobby. In the semi-separating equilibrium, the bad type never sends a message
and the good type sends one every now and then. The politician anticipates
these signalling strategies. He knows that a signal is a sure indicator of a good
state of the world, but that the state of the world is not necessarily bad if no
signal is sent. Accordingly, he chooses the good policy if he observes a signal;
if he does not observe one, he occasionally chooses the good policy, because he
knows that the good type sometimes remains silent.
Welfare implications
How can welfare eﬀects be measured? Since the politician is benevolent, welfare
is maximized if he implements the policy which maximizes his payoﬀ. Note that
welfare can be measured in one of two ways, either by the (ex ante) probability
that the politician chooses the correct policy, or by observing whether the
correct policy is implemented ex post. As a benchmark, consider the case
without lobbying. In this case, the politician chooses the policy according to
his a priori beliefs and maximizes expected welfare. Note that this does not
imply that the correct policy is indeed implemented when the actual state
of the world becomes known. The probability of an error depends on the a
priori knowledge and the payoﬀ of both policy choices. Does lobbying reduce
the probability of an error? I focus on the eﬀect of lobbying on welfare and
abstract from lobbying costs in the following.
In separating equilibria, full information is revealed through lobbying. In this
case, welfare is maximized and no error occurs. This makes the politician (and
welfare net of lobbying costs) strictly better oﬀ compared to the case when no
lobbying is allowed. There is only one separating equilibrium, namely when
lobbying costs are intermediate. Observe that the lobby is not necessarily
happy about its ability to lobby ex post: If the politician chooses the good
policy based on his a priori belief, then the possibility to lobby decreases the
payoﬀ to both the good and the bad type: The good type lobbies and incurs
costs in order to induce the good policy. But the politician would choose the
good policy anyhow if the decision were solely based on his a priori knowledge
and he knew that no lobbying is allowed. The bad type never realizes the
positive payoﬀ with lobbying (which on average it sometimes could without
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lobbying, depending on the a priori beliefs of the politician). Thus the good
type is trapped into obligatory signalling and the bad type loses payoﬀ. Hence
the lobby would, ex ante and ex post, strictly prefer a regime without lobbying.
This is not necessarily the case if the politician chooses the bad policy based
on his a priori belief. In this case, the good type gets the chance to induce
the good policy, and the bad type neither gains nor looses. Thus the expected
beneﬁt is strictly higher and the realized beneﬁt is weakly higher when lobbying
is allowed.
In contrast to the separating equilibrium, the politician does not gain any
additional information if the types pool. Pooling equilibria only exist if the
politician’s ex ante belief favors the good policy. In this case, the politician’s
payoﬀ and welfare are left unchanged if lobbying is possible. If the pooling
equilibrium induces no lobbying by any type, then the no lobbying outcome is
completely replicated and the expected payoﬀ to the lobby does not change.
If the pooling equilibrium induces lobbying of both types, then both types
of lobbies are strictly worse oﬀ with lobbying and the expected payoﬀ to the
lobbies decrease. Note that pooling equilibria exist for low and intermediate
signalling costs if the politician prefers the good policy based on his ex ante
beliefs, and in general with high signalling costs.
Semi-separating equilibria occur only if lobbying costs are low. In these equi-
libria information is revealed, but the politician still retains a degree of uncer-
tainty about the realized state. Moreover, the politician is sometimes mislead
by the bad type. It turns out that the beneﬁt of better information and the
cost of sometimes being mislead cancel out. Hence the politician receives the
same expected payoﬀ as in the case without lobbying, and expected welfare
remains unchanged. The payoﬀ to the lobby depends on the politician’s ex
ante belief and the equilibrium strategies. If the politician chooses the bad
state, both types beneﬁt in expectation. Hence the lobby beneﬁts in expec-
tation even before it knows its type. This does not necessarily imply that it
beneﬁts ex post: Since the politician will sometimes choose policy τ 1 despite
signalling, the good type sometimes invests in lobbying without beneﬁt. If the
politician chooses the good policy based on his a priori beliefs, the good and
the bad types lose in expectation, although the payoﬀ to the bad type may ex
post equal the payoﬀ without lobbying. The good type looses for two reasons:
The politician chooses the good policy less often and the lobby sometimes has
to bear signalling costs. Thus the lobby’s expected beneﬁt decreases.
In short, lobbying tends to increase welfare if we abstract from lobbying costs.
The politician learns the true state of the world in separating equilibria with
certainty, and increases his knowledge if semi-separating equilibria emerge.
Only if the types pool, do welfare eﬀects tend to be negative. In this case,
lobbies engage in costly activities without any eﬀect on the politician’s decision.
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Comparative statics
General comparative static results are diﬃcult to obtain when multiple equi-
libria exist because a slight change in any variable may lead to a jump from
one equilibrium to another. For this reason, only one general result is stated
here.12
The likelihood that lobbying occurs tends to increase in the payoﬀs to the
lobbies and decrease in the signalling costs. This result seems plausible at ﬁrst
glance and is valid in most cases. The reason is that the lobbies have to weigh
the expected beneﬁt against the costs of lobbying. However, this relationship
may be less clear cut in certain circumstances. In the assessment of their
lobbying strategies, the lobbies must take account of the politician’s reaction.
If for instance the beneﬁt of the bad type increases, the politician anticipates
its higher incentive to lobby. This in turn makes him less willing to react to
lobbying, which again decreases the lobbying incentives of the bad type. The
general likelihood of lobbying depends on the magnitude of these eﬀects, but
tends to increase in payoﬀs.
4.2 Lobbying competition and models of mass move-
ment
Counteractive Lobbying
Two approaches induce lobbying competition into the analysis. Austen-Smith
and Wright (1992) focus on the aspect of counteractive lobbying of two lobbies
with opposing interests. The politician decides between two policy alterna-
tives. Based on his a priori belief, he chooses the policy of the beneﬁtted
group. This gives the opposing group incentives to induce a policy deviation
through signalling, which in turn may lead to counteractive lobbying of the
beneﬁtted group, aimed at preventing any policy deviation. Hence lobbying
of the beneﬁtted group occurs only as counteractive lobbying, but never solely
to backup the belief the politician. The occurrence of lobbying depends on
the extent of veriﬁcation costs for the politician and the cost of information
acquisition for the lobbies.
Suppose that veriﬁcation costs are small relative to investigation costs. The
opposing group has an incentive to acquire costly information and send a
signal in this case. The politician occasionally veriﬁes the message and learns
the truth. If he does not verify, he listens to the opposing lobby and modiﬁes
his policy decision accordingly. The beneﬁtted group does not lobby in this
case, because the cost of acquiring information is excessive compared to the
chance of not loosing support occasionally, and counteractive lobbying does
not occur in this case. In contrast if veriﬁcation costs are high, the politician
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will not verify a single incoming signal and always verify if he receives two
contrasting ones. This implies that he always listens to the opposing group
if he does not also receive a second signal. Hence the beneﬁtted group must
engage in counteractive lobbying in order to prevent a loss of support. In this
situation, both interest groups are trapped in ineﬀective lobbying, because the
politician veriﬁes the messages and learns the truth after signalling occurred.
Models of mass movements
The analysis of Lohmann (1993) (compare also Lohmann (1994) and Lohmann
(1995b)) deviates from the basic lobbying model and yields some interesting
new insights concerning lobbies’ incentives to free-ride, and the eﬀect of prefer-
ence dispersion on the formation of mass movements. Again, the policy maker
decides between two given policy alternatives, which are now elements of a
continuous policy interval. There is a ﬁnite number of lobby groups, which
are distributed along this interval. They are characterized by single peaked
preferences about the policy in question, and each group prefers the policy
alternative which is closer to its ideal point. The distribution of the groups
along the interval is known to the politician. He is benevolent and seeks to
maximize welfare through implementation of the median policy.
The median voter setup is modiﬁed in the following way: Each lobby (and the
politician) knows that the eﬀect of the policy does not only depend on the
known part of the utility function, but also on the realized state of the world.
The realized state is unobservable to the groups and the politician. It is drawn
from the unit interval. Its distribution is common knowledge. Each group (but
not the policy maker) receives an imperfect signal about the state of the world
and updates its belief about its preferences accordingly. The signal serves as
a ”shifting” parameter which aﬀects each group’s assessment of the preferred
policy. Then each decides to send a costly signal to the politician, which is
interpreted (without loss of generality) as a vote for policy alternative τ 1. The
politician observes the number of signals, updates his belief concerning the
preferred policy of the median voter, and decides accordingly.
Let me ﬁrst provide some intuition for the lobbying decision of the interest
groups. Each group compares the lobbying costs with the expected bene-
ﬁt, which depends on the utility diﬀerence between the policy alternatives,
weighted by the probability that the lobbying eﬀort is pivotal for the politi-
cian’s choice. Consider ﬁrst ”extremists”, who are deﬁned as groups which
prefer a policy alternative independent of the received signal. Extremists pre-
ferring τ 1 always have an incentive to lobby, whereas extremists preferring the
policy alternative will never do. Hence lobbying by extremists conveys no in-
formation if the politician knows that it is lobbied by extremists. In contrast,
the preferred policy of ”moderates” critically depends on the received signal.
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Those who receive a signal in favor of τ 1 face incentives to lobby, whereas
the others do not. Hence only lobbying by moderates conveys information to
the politician, because their decision to lobby reveals information about the
received signal. But not each groups facing incentives to lobby in fact do so,
because incentives to free-ride exist. Net of lobbying costs, only some mod-
erates facing incentives ﬁnd it worthwhile to incur the costs. Hence, some
moderates send a message while some free ride on others, even though both
face incentives gross of lobbying costs.
Next consider the choice of the politician and the amount of extracted informa-
tion. The politician is able to calculate the number of lobbying and abstaining
extremists. Moreover, he is able to infer how many moderates will lobby given
any possible realization of the state of the world. The diﬀerence between the
observed number of lobbyists and the calculated number of extremists bears
information about the state of the world. This is the information he is able
to extract after observation of the lobbying movement. He updates his beliefs
accordingly and then makes his policy choice. As interest groups anticipate
this behavior in equilibrium, some do in fact engage in costly lobbying.
The critical parameters which determine the amount of information revelation
are the lobbying costs and the dispersion of preferences across all individuals.
Consider the case of almost homogenous individuals and no lobbying costs,
such that all individuals are moderates. By counting the number of lobbyists,
the politician is able to infer how many received a signal in favor of policy τ 1.
He is able to extract all information which is dispersed across the population
in this case. (This is not equivalent to full information, because the aggre-
gate dispersed information is itself a signal about the true state of the world.)
In contrast, full information revelation is not possible if preferences are het-
erogenous. Some lobbyists are extremists, and number counting of extremists
delivers no information. As extremists are more likely to occur if preferences
are dispersed, less information is revealed in equilibrium if the population is
less homogenous. Second, lobbying costs increase moderates’ incentives to
free-ride. More moderates abstain, which decreases the amount of information
to the politician.
In sum, lobbying is more likely to increase welfare if the population is homoge-
nous and lobbying costs are small: Positive lobbying costs reduce the amount
of revealed information because more free-riders abstain from lobbying; het-
erogenous preferences reduce information revelation because more lobbying is
done by extremists, which is uninformative. Note that there is some kind
of ”policy neutrality” of lobbying activities. Exogenous asymmetries between
lobby groups have no eﬀect on the induced policy change through political
action. The politician knows how many individuals have an incentive to lobby
and discounts the observed number accordingly. Being large is not worth much
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if the politician expects a large movement; and being few may be eﬀective if
the politician expects no engagement based on his a priori beliefs.
4.3 Extensions
4.3.1 Information acquisition
By the politician
Suppose that the policy maker has the opportunity to learn the true state of the
world either by independent investigation if no lobbying occurs or veriﬁcation
of a received signal (Rasmusen 1993). (Compare also Rasmusen (1997) and
Sloof (1997c). For a variation of the following theme, Potters and van Winden
(1992), Austen-Smith and Wright (1992), and Sloof (1997a).) Investigation
and veriﬁcation are costly, with investigation exceeding veriﬁcation costs. The
analysis focusses on the semi-separating equilibrium which results if lobbying
costs are small and the politician selects the unfavorable policy based on his a
priori beliefs.
the resulting equilibria depend on the relation between investigation and veri-
ﬁcation costs. Obviously, if veriﬁcation costs are high, veriﬁcation is no option
and the equilibrium does not change compared to the basic model. Suppose
that veriﬁcation costs are low, but investigation costs are prohibitively high
such that the politician never investigates. The interest group still has in-
centives to signal despite the risk of veriﬁcation. In equilibrium, the good
type always lobbies, the bad type lobbies sometimes and the politician veri-
ﬁes now and then. Lobbying of the bad type is successful if it is not veriﬁed,
which induces a policy change. Expected gross welfare increases compared
to the basic model in this case. The bad type has less incentives to mislead
the politician, because it faces the risk of exposure through veriﬁcation. It
lies less often, which improves the politician’s decision and decreases its ex-
pected payoﬀ. Note that this equilibrium also holds if investigation costs are
low, but there are additional equilibria in this case. One is a pooling equilib-
rium without lobbying, and investigation by the politician. This equilibrium
is characterized by the fact that the good type passes on signalling costs to
the politician, since the good policy is always implemented without any need
to lobby.
By the lobby
Lagerlof (1997) extends the basic model and assumes that the interest group
is imperfectly informed. Investigation by the lobby implies that it learns the
true state of the world with an exogenously given probability. The politician
cannot observe if the lobby investigates. In the second stage, the interest
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groups decides whether it sends a signal or not. Lying is not possible. The
insight of this paper is that the lobby may be forced to acquire information
if the politician expects it to do so, even though it would not do so if the
politician did not update his beliefs to its disadvantage in case of no lobbying.
Hence the lobby may be trapped in information acquisition which reduces its
expected payoﬀ, but increases expected aggregate welfare.
4.3.2 Endogenous signalling costs: Access buying
Signalling costs are exogenous in the previous models. But they contain infor-
mation about a lobby’s value of being heard if the lobby or the politician are
able to determine these costs endogenously. Signalling costs serve as an access
device in this case, which inform the politician about the beneﬁt of grating
access to certain groups.
Lohmann (1995a) uses a slightly modiﬁed setup of her model of mass movement
to focus on contributions as an access device (compare also Austen-Smith
(1995) and Austen-Smith (1998)). In this modiﬁcation, each lobby either sends
one of two costless messages, indicating which policy alternative it prefers, or
no message at all. Lying is possible. To convince the politician that it is worth
to consider the signal as being informative, each group oﬀers an individual
amount of contributions. These serve as an access device, indicating if a lobby
has something to say. They do not increase the payoﬀ to the politician.
Two key insights result from this modiﬁcation: First, moderates gain access
without costs, because the politician anticipates that moderates have no incen-
tives to lie. Their messages are inﬂuential with zero contributions. In contrast,
extremists may have incentives to lie if they receive a signal which contradicts
its prior preferences. Those receiving backing signals have incentives to report
this truthfully. Hence the politician and truth-telling interest groups prefer to
separate truth-tellers from liars. Contributions are a means for that: Since
both types of extremists update their beliefs about the expected gain from
either policy, extremists who receive an encouraging signal and update their
beliefs accordingly have a higher stake in the preferred policy than extrem-
ists who receive an unfavorable signal. Full separation between these groups
is possible: The politician listens only to those messages which are accom-
panied by contributions worth to be paid for ”those who have something to
say”. Second, full information is revealed in equilibrium, because all moder-
ates send messages (free-riding does not occur because access costs are zero
for moderates). Moreover, extremists separate completely through the oﬀer of
contribution payments.
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4.3.3 Signalling as instrument with two purposes
Some studies conceptualize contribution payments and informational lobbying
in a single framework. The idea is that a single lobbying instrument embod-
ies both channels of inﬂuence, namely information transmission and buying
goodwill. Depending on the relevant setup, either the politician sets an access
charge which reﬂects his interest in information and money (Austen-Smith
1998), or the lobby oﬀers a contribution schedule which buys goodwill and re-
veals information about the lobby’s type (Ball 1995). (Compare Prat (2001),
Mueller and Stratmann (1994) for models in the context of electoral com-
petition.) Both models diﬀer with respect to their particular setup, but the
resulting equilibria reﬂect a general insight: Contributions deteriorate policies,
because a self-interested politician has incentives to sacriﬁce aggregate welfare
for money. However, contributions also serve as a signalling device and en-
tail helpful information for the politician. The equilibria reﬂect this trade-oﬀ:
Lobbying tends to increase welfare for informational reasons, but not as much
as if the politician was completely benevolent and did not care for contribution
payments.
4.3.4 Miscellaneous
Some analysis of signalling do not ﬁt well into one of the above categoriza-
tions. For instance, Sloof and van Winden (2000) analyze a lobby which can
build up reputation through two diﬀerent types of lobbying activities. They
show that a lobby may have incentives to ”show their teeth ﬁrst” in order to
build up reputation, even if this decreases proﬁts in the short run. Bennedsen
and Feldman (2000) compare diﬀerent institutions in a signalling setup and
analyze lobbies’ incentives to engage in political action. Finally, Ainsworth
and Sened (1993) analyze lobbying incentives of an interest group which acts
as an intermediary between the politician and the population, and behaves
strategically vis a vis both.
5 The instrument choice of lobbies
The literature on lobbying divides into two broad strands as the preceding
sections indicate: Lobbying is analyzed either as contribution payments, or
as a means of transmitting information. The question arises which type of
lobbying interest groups prefer. To my best knowledge, there are only two
recent approaches which pick this question as a central theme. I will indicate
the ﬁrst steps of this promising direction of research in the following.
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Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002) focus on the instrument choice of lobbying.
They assume that an interest group may inﬂuence a political decision in two
independent ways: First, it may engage in costly information acquisition and
transfer the result truthfully, as is known form the signalling literature. Second,
the lobby determines contribution payments, which compensates the politician
for a deviation towards its preferred policy choice. The question arises which
type of lobbying the interest group prefers, and how these instruments aﬀect
each other.
The approach resembles some insights from the signalling literature: Abstract-
ing from contributions payments, the interest group is c.p. more likely to en-
gage in informational lobbying if the cost of information acquisition is small,
the stakes in the preferred policy are large, and the probability of successful
investigation is high. And given that the politician has a belief about the state
of the world, the lobby exactly compensates the politician in order to achieve
a certain policy deviation.
The authors then focus on the interaction between both types of lobbying.
Consider the decision to acquire costly information. The politician updates
his belief to the beneﬁt of the lobby if he receives a signal, but to its disad-
vantage if he receives none. The latter case implies that investigation entails
indirect search costs, because the politician updates his beliefs to the disad-
vantage of the lobby in case of negative search results. Hence, the decision
to invest in information acquisition may on the one hand render contribution
payments unnecessary, but on the other hand increase necessary contribution
payments in the case of bad news. The authors show that the indirect search
costs increase if the lobby has high stakes in the preferred policy outcome, or
the probability of successful information acquisition is small. Hence the exis-
tence of contribution payments as an alternative lobbying instrument makes
informational lobbying less likely.13 Note that both types of lobbying may
occur if informational lobbying is beneﬁcial in expectation, but turns out to
be unsuccessful ex post.
Polk and Schmutzler (2002) focusses on lobbying competition and the instru-
ment choice in a reduced form approach. Two interest groups engage in lob-
bying against environmental regulation. Two types of lobbying exist, which
both increase individual pollution standards: General lobbying leads to higher
pollution standards for all interest groups, which implies that lobbies provide
a public good with respect to each other through this type of lobbying. For
instance, general lobbying eﬀorts may be informational lobbying which informs
the politician about the consequences of environmental regulation. Addition-
ally, both lobbies may also engage in private lobbying. They compete through
this type of engagement, because private lobbying increases the individual pol-
lution on account of the opponent. For instance, private lobbying may induce
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loopholes to one group, which restricts the availability of loopholes to the other
group.
The question arises in which lobbying type the interest groups engage and
which policy emerges. Suppose that the politician becomes more responsive
to private lobbying. As a direct eﬀect, the increase of the marginal beneﬁt of
private lobbying leads to more private and less general lobbying. But private
lobbying eﬀorts are strategic substitutes, which might dampen or counteract
the ﬁrst eﬀect. It turns out that both interest groups increase private lob-
bying in a symmetric equilibrium, but that both may react diﬀerently in an
asymmetric setup.
The main insight is that the politician may actively increase lobbying com-
petition between interest groups by getting more responsive to private lobby-
ing. This induces diversion from general to private lobbying. He may have
incentives to do so, as the political decision and the environmental quality
tend to improve:14 Counteractive activities dominate in this case and lobbies
are trapped in ineﬀective distributional activities. Instead of jointly lobby-
ing against environmental regulation, they divert from their original interest.
Hence, the model indicates that a politician’s ability to react to a certain type
of lobbying may aﬀect the lobbying instruments employed by interest groups.
Despite these two approaches, open questions for further research remain. For
instance, what determines which type of lobbying occurs? Does this depend
on the policy at stance, the degree of lobbying competition, or public concern
about the policy? The general task is to combine these two independent ap-
proaches towards lobbying, at which end of line a general lobbying model may
possibly emerge.
6 Conclusions
This survey deals with two main channels of how interest groups inﬂuence
political decisions. The common agency approach views politics as a market,
where contribution payments buy policies. Payments may be legal donations or
illegal bribes, but the underlying idea is of much broader scope and lies beyond
pure money oﬀers. For instance, contributions may take on the form of job
promises past the incumbency, campaign sponsorship, or backing from speciﬁc
groups like trade-union members or addicts of the tabloid press. The main
assumption of this approach is that politicians follow individual objectives
which depart from maximization of aggregate welfare.
The second channel of inﬂuence abstracts from the idea that politicians are
self-interested. It relies on the concept of asymmetric information. The idea
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is that politicians face capacity constraints, which give them informational
disadvantages vis a vis lobbies. Time constraints of politicians are not the
only reasons why this is the case. Political decisions are often very important
for speciﬁc sectors, which provides the relevant interest groups with strong
incentives to concentrate forces. In contrast, politicians have to spread their
forces on a diverse range of politics at the same time. Moreover, companies
often possess private information which is important for the political decisions,
as for instance data about costs and demand, or technological expertise.
The above examples lead to the impression that welfare eﬀects of lobbying are
negative. From a theoretical point of view, this is indeed true if lobbying takes
the form of contribution payments in exchange for political favors. As indi-
cated in sections 2 and 3, aggregate welfare declines if politicians deviate from
ﬁrst best practices, which incurs deadweight losses on behalf of the public. A
prohibition of lobbying improves aggregate welfare according to this approach.
The extent of the negative lobbying eﬀect depends on speciﬁc circumstances.
For instance, if lobbying competition and conﬂict of interest is strong, the ex-
pected decline of aggregate welfare is relatively small. Thus, a prohibition of
lobbying in policy ﬁelds with a large set of strong and opposing interest groups
will not improve welfare much. It only serves to reduce lobbying expenditures.
Moreover, the eﬀect of a prohibition depends on the extent of the politician’s
weight on aggregate welfare if lobbying inﬂuence is intense. If we expect that
politicians care about aggregate welfare in policy areas attracting much public
attention (and they care less about aggregate welfare in apparently unimpor-
tant ﬁelds), lobbying is inﬂuential in unpopular policy ﬁelds. Hence, negative
welfare eﬀects occur especially in areas which are important but arise little
public attention. In contrast, lobbying in policy ﬁelds with much public atten-
tion is less eﬀective, especially if competing interests are active.
In contrast to this view, lobbying may well be welfare-enhancing if it improves
the informational basis of political decisions. Particularities depend on sig-
nalling costs, the degree of lobbying competition, and the extent of politicians’
information if no lobbying takes place. For instance, if signalling costs are high
enough separation between those who truthfully inform the politician about
the state of the world and others results. Aggregate welfare (net of lobbying
costs) increases. If information is good even without lobbying, the politician
will extract only little new information. In this case lobbying has only minor
positive welfare eﬀects; it may even turn negative if we take account of its
costs and of the idea that lobbying eﬀorts are probably unproductive activities
(Bhagwati 1995). Lobbying competition has ambiguous eﬀects: On the one
hand, it tends to improve information available to the politician. On the other
hand, more uninformative money is spent in the lobbying process (compare
section 4.2).
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The distribution of gains from lobbying depends on diﬀerent factors. First,
it is a relatively robust insight that politicians improve their payoﬀs through
lobbying. Lobbying provides beneﬁts either in the form of contribution pay-
ments or through transmission of information. This result is not surprising: If
politicians do not beneﬁt from lobbying, foreclosure is an option. Hence they
can always do at least as good with lobbying as without. Accordingly, their
payoﬀ must increase if they allow lobbying activities.
The eﬀect of lobbying on unorganized interests depends on the channel of in-
ﬂuence. Consider contribution payments: In this case, politicians deviate from
welfare maximizing policies in order to attract money. Unorganized interests
lose. They are the victims of policies motivated by selﬁshness, which impose
costs on the public. The best possible (and rather theoretical) situation is
that lobbying exposes no costs on the unorganized. This is the knife edge case
of strong lobbying competition, where lobbies engage in pure counteractive
activities and no welfare eﬀect occurs. On the other hand, it is a relatively
robust insight that unorganized interests beneﬁt from lobbying if it takes the
form of information transmission. Although lobbies are now and then able
to mislead the politician to the disadvantage of the public, in aggregate the
quality of political decisions improves. The intuition is that politicians extract
information, which is not available if no lobbying takes place.
Payoﬀs of organized interests depend on the degree of lobbying competition.
Beneﬁts tend to decrease if lobbying competition is strong. For instance, a
single lobby is able to extract the full private rent created through political
interaction, and it beneﬁts from the possibility of lobbying. In contrast, lobbies
are captured in ineﬃcient activities if lobbying competition is strong. In this
case, interests groups loose. They have incentives to cooperate or even prefer
a prohibition of lobbying. These insights are broadly valid for both types of
inﬂuence channels, even though subtleties remain. For instance, the extent of
the beneﬁts to lobbies depend on the degree of policy eﬃciency. With weak
lobbying competition, eﬃcient policy instruments tend to increase lobbies’
payoﬀs. Compensations for policy deviations need to be rather small in this
case. But the reverse holds if lobbying competition is strong (compare section
3.2). Compensation payments need to be high in order to prevent the politician
from an unfavorable policy deviation if the policy instrument is eﬃcient. As
a second example, consider the free-riding aspect of lobbying. It occurs if
several lobbies follow a common interest. In this case, lobbying beneﬁts are
high because competition is weak. But beneﬁts depend also on the possibility
of free-riding. If free-riding is easy, less than optimal inﬂuence occurs from
a lobbies’ point of view, which tends to decrease payoﬀs. Lobbies with small
policy stakes tend to gain from free-riding, whereas those with high stakes
loose.
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This leads us to the insight that relevant policy ﬁelds for eﬀective lobbying are
characterized by weak lobbying competition, rather symmetric interests, little
public attention and eﬃcient policy instruments for redistribution. Moreover,
much can be gained if information transmission is important for the politician.
It is noteworthy that politicians always gain from lobbying, whereas lobbies do
not necessarily do so. Politicians beneﬁt more if lobbying competition is high,
the policy instrument is eﬃcient and little public attention arises. Politicians
are the winners of this game, special interests only sometimes. Accordingly, it
is not surprising that politicians have only small incentives to prohibit lobbying
- except possibly in a few policy ﬁelds arising much public attention.
There is ample scope for further research. As already indicated, the instru-
ment choice of lobbies is not yet well understood: In which type of lobbying
activities do interest groups engage? And what are the relevant determinants
of this choice? Moreover, the question of group formation yields room for
further research. For instance, why do we observe many inﬂuential large in-
terest groups in reality, although theory predicts that small groups can easier
overcome the free-rider problem? Fixed costs of group formation may be an
answer to this question, but this should be made more precise and enriched by
further arguments. Finally, empirical insights are still rare in this important
ﬁeld of research, especially in the context of European politics. Case studies
may help to gain insights where a lack of data prohibits empirical research.
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Notes
1Models of electoral competition (Baron 1989, Besley and Coate 2001) as
well as models focusing on institutional setups (Bennedsen and Feldman 2000)
are not subject of this survey. For a recent survey on empirical investigations,
consider for instance Sloof (1997b).
2Compare Helpman (1995), Rodrik (1995), Austen-Smith (1996), Sloof
(1997b), Persson (1998), Persson and Tabellini (2000), Potters and vanWinden
(1996), Ursprung (2000).
3To be precise, note that the model does not incorporate cooperative be-
havior, which is necessary to form such a coalition. Rather, think of the ’joint
deviation’ as a deviation which is induced by the lobby through an appropriate
modiﬁcation of the contribution function.
4Note that there may be policy alternatives which reduce the utility level
of the individual compared to the reference policy. The principal oﬀers zero
contributions for these alternatives, because contributions are restricted to be
non-negative. His payoﬀ for these policy alternatives is then smaller than the
payoﬀ of the reference policy.
5For empirical evidence consult Goldberg and Maggi (1999), and Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay (2000).
6Analogous results hold for the exporting sectors.
7Domestic contribution oﬀers are not observed by the foreign country. This
implies that governments cannot set their trade policies dependent on the
contribution oﬀers of the foreign lobbies, which in turn implies that lobbies do
not set their contribution oﬀers to inﬂuence the foreign country. The deﬁnition
of the equilibrium reﬂects this: Contribution oﬀers and trade policies are best
responses to the other country’s trade policy, but not to foreign contribution
oﬀers.
8Note that the small country assumption of the basic lobbying model can
be interpreted as inﬁnite foreign supply and demand elasticities.
9Note that the eﬀect on the equilibrium structure of protection is ambiguous
in this case, and positive protection of the organized may increase or decrease:
If the politician caters more to interest groups, positive protection increases
for a given number of interest groups. But more groups organize and lobbying
competition increases, which tends to decrease protection. The total eﬀect
is ambiguous. Negative protection of the unorganized increases in any case,
because more individuals gain from exploitation of the unorganized, and the
politician caters more to special interests even with a given number of interest
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groups.
10Equilibria are characterized by strategies for each player and beliefs about
the uncertain states of the world at the time a player is called upon to act.
The equilibrium strategies are chosen such that each player’s expected payoﬀ
is maximized, given the other players’ equilibrium strategies and their beliefs
about the states of the world. Beliefs are derived from the a priori knowledge
and updated according to Bayes’ rule. Compare for instance Gibbons (1992),
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995).
11The term ”lobbies” refers to the diﬀerent types of the lobby.
12For details consult Potters and van Winden (1992).
13Investigation is more likely if the politician is not able to observe whether
the lobby investigates or not. The expected loss of a disadvantageous search is
smaller in this case, because the politician is left with uncertainty over whether
the absent signal is due to no search eﬀort instead of bad news.
14The responsiveness towards private lobbying may also depend on the type
of regulation under consideration. For instance, a certain type of regulation
may be achieved through diﬀerent policy alternatives, leaving more discretion
to the politician. In this case, it is likely that interest groups engage in private
lobbying, and general lobbying becomes relatively unimportant. On the other
hand, if only a single policy instrument is available to achieve a certain policy
outcome, policy discretion is small. It is likely that interest groups will focus
on general lobbying in this case, which leads to eﬀective lobbying and low
regulation.
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